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Abstract
Contemporary global security threats pose a serious challenge to the
existing international legal regime on the use of force. Preventing the
potentially devastating consequences of an unconventional armed attack
launched by terrorist groups or hostile governments might require an earlier
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action. Yet, international law seriously restricts the ability of States to respond
to such risks using military force in the absence of an actual or imminent armed
attack, or Security Council authorization. The U.S. National Security Strategy
of 2002 seeks to modify the current regime by expanding the narrow standard
of imminence that traditionally defines the scope ofjustifiable unilateral action
against threatened attacks. More ambitiously, it pushes aside the normative
restraints to the launch of preventive military strikes by declaring the willingness of the U.S. administration to act alone against more remote threats before
they have fully materialized. This paper addresses the tension between the
existing legal rules governing the unilateral use of force and the assertions that
these rules should be expansively interpreted, or even modified, to properly
reflect the compelling needs of the new security environment. It seeks to
evaluate, in abstract terms, the ramifications of such proposals and lays out the
dimensions of the possible normative change.
I. INTRODUCTION

To put it simply, and, I fear, through a banality it may not
deserve, the message is that there must be limits to the exercise of
power.. . and that when professional men and women engage in an
argument about what is lawful and what is not, they are engaged in a
politics that imagines the possibility of a community.

. .

allowing a

meaningful distinction between lawful constraint and the application
of naked power.1
Drafted at the conclusion of the most destructive war in history, the United
Nations (UN) Charter sought to prevent aggressive war by eliminating virtually
all uses of force between States, save in cases of individual or collective selfdefence against an armed attack or under authorization of the Security Council.
Six decades later, however, inter-state wars are no longer the main threat to the
stability of the international system. Rather, the threat of asymmetric warfare,
launched by international terrorist organizations and hostile governments
holding weapons of mass destruction, 2 forced the international community to
reconsider the Cold-War State-centred paradigm of armed conflict, which had
framed the structure of international law on the use of force for the past half a
century.

1.

MARTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS:

THE RISE AND FALL OF

INTERNATIONAL LAw 1870-1960 503 (2002).

2.
The phrase "hostile governments" refers in this paper to governments with weapons of mass
destruction that manifest certain hostile intent and/or support the activities of terrorist groups residing within
their territories.
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This mismatch between the contemporary threat environment and
international legal rules on the use of force generated a degree of scepticism
among statesmen and scholars as to whether the existing international rules are
still applicable to the rapidly changing security context. Claims have been
made that the existing legal framework no longer enables states to efficiently
respond to the changing security needs. In its 2002 National Security Strategy
(NSS), the U.S. administration called for a more permissive approach to the use
of force in self-defence.' They did so in two decisively different ways. The
NSS first proposes a more expansive reading of the traditional standard of
imminence, which arguably defines the scope of a legally valid unilateral action
against an enemy that isjust aboutto attack.4 More ambitiously, the NSS drops
this narrow standard of imminence altogether by declaring the willingness of
the US administration to act alone against purely hypothetical threats even
before they have fully emerged.'
At the outset, the semantics at play must be clarified. The terms "anticipatory," "pre-emptive" or "preventive" self-defence are often used interchangeably, but should not be regarded as synonyms since many practical consequences result from their use or misuse. For the purpose of this paper, the term
"anticipatory" denotes military actions against imminent threats of an armed
attack, while the term "preventive" designates the use of military force against
developments or behaviour that may mature into threats of an armed attack at
some unspecified time in the future. In the context of this essay, the term "preemptive" refers to the doctrine of anticipatory, not preventive, self-defence,
unless used differently in the context of quoted statements.
The following analysis is both descriptive, drawing upon the current
international regulation of the use of force (de lege lata), and prescriptive,
reading the validity of anticipatory and preventive military actions from the
perspective of the future of international law (de legeferenda). The first part
of the paper examines whether the existing rules permit unilateral military
action against threatened attacks and suggests that States may use force in
anticipation of an imminent armed attack under certain stringent conditions.
The second part proceeds to examine the claims that international legal rules on
the use of force need to be relaxed or even changed to accommodate new
realities. While granting that defensive military actions may be justified, in
extreme cases, even when the threat is overwhelming but not temporally
imminent, the present writer concludes that accepting the logic of unilateral

3.
See generally White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(Sept. 17, 2002) [hereinafter National Security Strategy].
4.
Id. at 15.
5.
Id.
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preventive military action against the threats-to-be remains abhorrent to the
global order governed by the rule of law.
Two methodological notes must be made at the beginning to delimit the
subject and evade confusion. First, although the U.S. National Security
Strategy has stimulated the present discussion, it is referred to primarily for
illustrative reasons. It exemplifies an actual policy debate, by bringing specific
contemporary threats into focus and proposing specific means of dealing with
them, including unilateral military action in extreme cases. However, the aim
of this paper is not to evaluate the legality of any particular governmental policy
or action. Rather, it addresses the questions of anticipatory and preventive
actions in general and abstract terms. Second, although the relevance of both
strategic considerations and moral dilemmas of this thorny issue cannot be
denied, these aspects are beyond the scope of this paper, which centres upon the
legal arguments on legitimate responses to contemporary security needs.
HI. CURRENT SCENARIOS: NORMATIVE RESTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE

A. Point of Departure: Prohibitionof the Use of Force
The starting point is uncontroversial: The Charter of the United Nations
emphasizes that peace is the fundamental aim of the newly established international organization, and is to be preserved if at all possible.6 The preamble
expresses a determination of the United Nations "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," "to practice tolerance and live together in peace
with one another as good neighbours," "to unite our strength to maintain
international peace and security," and to ensure "that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest."7 Article 1(1) sets forth as the primary
purpose of the United Nations:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which

might lead to a breach of the peace.'
The Charter then goes on to set out two fundamental principles of the
United Nations. First, Article 2(3) asks States to settle their international

6.
7.
8.

See generallyU.N. Charter at Preamble.
Id. at Preamble.
Id. at art. 1, para. 1.
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disputes by peaceful means. 9 Second, Article 2(4) articulates the general
prohibition of the use of force:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.'"
Unquestionably, the prohibition of the use or threat of force contained in
Article 2(4) forms not only a part of the conventional" but also of general
customary international law. The International Court of Justice has described
this provision as a rule ofjus cogens, binding upon all States, not only members
of the United Nations. 12 The travauxprdparatoiresof the UN Charter reveal
that Article 2(4) was intended to operate as an "absolute all-inclusive
prohibition; the phrase 'or in any other manner' was designed to ensure that
there should be no loopholes."' 3 This view is supported by the majority of
scholarship, including commentators like Charney,"4 Dinstein, I5 Gray, 16 and
Randelzhofer.17 States are prohibited from using force in international relations
and from threatening others with the use of force in all but narrowly defined
circumstances. In other words, the effect of Article 2(4) is that any specific use
of force is lawful only if it is based on a legal exception to this prohibition.
The Charter explicitly envisaged only two exceptional situations: 1)
collective military enforcement action taken or authorized by the UN Security
Council in accordance with Chapter VII (and by extension for regional
organizations under Chapter VIII); and 2) the exercise of individual or
collective self-defence as outlined in Article 51 of the Charter.'" The legality

9.

Id.at art. 2, para 3.

10.
Id.at art. 2, para. 4.
11.
See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (5th ed. 1998). Not
only the U.N. Charter but also, inter alia, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
(1933), the Charter of the Organization of American States (1948), the Helsinki Final Act (1975).
12.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99-100 (June 27).
13.
See, e.g., United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, U.S., June
4, 1945, Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee 1/1, 334-35.
14.
Jonathan I. Charneyet al., EditorialComments: NA TO's Kosovo Intervention,93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 824, 835 (1999).
15.

YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 82 (Cambridge University Press

2001) (1988).
16.
17.

CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 24-26 (2nd ed. 2004).
ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

COMMENTARY 106, 112-13 (Brunno Simma ed., 2002).

18.

U.N. Charter, supra note 6, at chapters 7-8.

A
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of any military action will, therefore, depend on the applicability of either of
these exceptions, which are examined below.
B. Military Actions Authorized by the Security Council
The UN Charter does in fact envision the possibility of addressing an
emerging threat with military force if necessary. Under Chapter VII, the
Security Council may authorize military action not only in response to an act
of aggression or a breach of the peace, but even against threats to the peace with
a view to preserve international peace and security. 9 Should a State pose a
threat to another, the Charter gives full authority to the Security Council as "the
international community's collective security voice ' to provide a response
beginning with non-violent sanctions leading up to use of military force,
including preventive force, to preserve international peace and security.2
This position was re-stated recently by the UN High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change and subsequently by the Secretary-General
Kofi Annan in his report In largerfreedom.2 2 In its report of December 2004,
the Panel concluded that the Security Council mandate under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter is broad enough to include approval of coercive action even where
the threat is not imminent and even if it involves non-State actors. 23 In fact,
when all other preventive efforts have failed, collective military action is seen
24
by the panel as a cornerstone of effective collective security system.
Given the broad political discretion the Council enjoys in acting under
Chapter VII, the question emerges of how its power should be exercised "when
the Charter offers no specific criteria, when States see their interests so
differently and when some States exercise so much more influence than
others. 2 ' Taking these concerns into consideration, the High-level Panel
proposed the following criteria to guide the Council's decision on recourse to
armed force: seriousness of threat; proper purpose; last resort; proportional
means; and balance of consequences.26

19.
Id. at chapter 7.
20.
The High-Level Panel, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
194, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the High-level Panel].
21.
U.N. Charter, supra note 6, at art. 39-42.
22.
See generallyThe Secretary-General, In LargerFreedom:TowardsDevelopment, Securityand
Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005) [hereinafter In LargerFreedom].
23.
Report of the High-level Panel,supra note 20, at 193.
24.
Id. at R 190-91.
25.
Gareth Evans, When is it Right to Fight? Legality, Legitimacy and the Use of Military Force,
Lecture at Oxford University (May 10, 2004), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.
cfm?id=2747&l=l (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
26.
Report of the High-level Panel,supra note 20, at 207.
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Thus, as a safeguard against future violent actions between States, the
Charter introduced a system of collective security to replace the previously
almost unfettered recourse to unilateral military actions. Should a State pose
a threat to another, the Charter gives full authority to the Security Council as
"the international community's collective security voice ' ,27 to provide a
response beginning with non-violent sanctions leading up to use of military
force, including preventive force, to preserve international peace and security.
After all, as Christopher Greenwood observed, "the Charter is about keeping
2
the peace, not about pacifism., 1
C.

UnilateralActions: Self-Defence andIts Limits
1. Self-Defence against Threats of Attacks under the UN Charter

Without a Security Council authorization, States may only use force in
individual or collective self-defence to repel an armed attack. 29 The provision
of Article 51 of the Charter provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security.3"
The language of Article 51 clearly stipulates that self-defence is lawful
only where there is an armed attack, clearly a narrower notion than the use (or
threat) of force prohibited by Article 2(4). Not every use of force necessarily
amounts to an armed attack and consequently States are not entitled to defend
themselves against every use of force.3 1 The interpretation of the phrase "armed
attack" is a matter of significant disagreement and the Charter itself offers no
27.
Id. at 194.
28.
Christopher Greenwood, InternationalLaw and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan,
AI-Qaida,andIraq,4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 10 (2003).
29.
The term "self-defence" is hereinafter used to denote both the individual and collective modes
of self-defence.
30.
UN Charter, supra note 6, at art. 5 1.
31.
This is in perfect accord with the architecture of the Charter regulation of the use of force
significantly limiting the unilateral force of States in favour of the multilateral response through collective
security mechanisms.
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guidance on this issue. 32 Nevertheless, it is widely accepted today that the
notion of armed attack includes the indirect attacks in which a State does not
use military force against another State directly, but through the use of nonthey
State actors(such as insurgents), as well as acts by non-State actors, when
33
are equivalent, by its "scale and effects," to an armed attack by a State.
Moreover, the Charter itself gives no clear answer as to whether unilateral
military action against a threat of an armed attack may ever be justified. The
language of Article 51 makes it clear that self-defence is lawful only when an
armed attack occurs and not as a first strike option. However, the Charter does
not define at which point in time an "armed attack" begins and nothing in this
provision itself implies the legality or illegality of the use of force in cases
when an armed attack is about to occur.
Since the Charter is silent about whether "self-defence" includes the
anticipatory use of force, other general sources of international law must be
used, including state practice and the works of learned writers on international
law.34
2. Anticipatory Self-Defence in Customary International Law
Before the Second World War, international customary law traditionally
endorsed the idea that a State can respond to an impending attack. The doctrine
of anticipatory self-defence appears in the early writings of legal philosophers
such as. Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel, although with no common understanding of its scope.35 For instance, Grotius wrote that the danger "must be
immediate and imminent in point of time... but those who accept fear of any
sort as justifying anticipatory slaying are themselves greatly deceived and
deceive others."36 In turn, Vattel opined that a nation has "the right to prevent
an injury where it sees itself threatened with one."3 7

32.
Two main contemporary approaches exist to the reading of the doctrine of self-defence and the
meaning of 'armed attack' in its temporal sense: that which is narrowly construed as to allow self-defence
only in response to an actual armed attack and the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence justifying military
action also against imminent armed attacks.
33.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, M194-95 (June 27). State
practice, at least in the aftermath of the 9/1i, supports such interpretation of Article 51.
34.
Following the conception formulated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
35.
For a detailed comment on their writings see Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of
Preemption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209, 216 (2003).
36. HUGO GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LtBRI TRES 173 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925),
quoted in Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Pre-emptive Self-Defence, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599
(2003).
37.
EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916).
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Based on the Webster formula, articulated in 1837 in the context of the
U.K.-U.S. Caroline dispute, military action in self-defence was deemed
legitimate only if the "necessity of self-defence [was] instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation ....
In line
with the general traditional criteria, self-defence in anticipation of an armed
attack is justified only when it is necessary and proportional to the threat at
hand, in other words, self-defence must not be retributive or punitive.
The applicability of this customary law doctrine after the entry into force
of the UN Charter and its general ban on the unilateral force remains somewhat
debatable. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the disagreement between States on this issue: "They have disagreed about whether [s]tates
have the right to use military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against
imminent threats; whether they have the right to use it preventively to defend
themselves against latent or non-imminent threats ...
In practice, states
have mostly refrained from invoking the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence
to justify their military actions after 1945 even when the facts of the case would
allow it.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is often mentioned as an example of
anticipatory self-defence. However, the Soviet-Cuban maritime quarantine
imposed unilaterally by the United States to intercept the missiles, travelling on
the high seas to be installed by the Soviets in Cuba, was never justified by the
United States in this way. Instead, the U.S. administration claimed to have
taken a regional enforcement action previously authorized by the Organization
of American States.4 °
In one particularly relevant example, Israel argued that its attack against
Egypt beginning the Six Days War in 1967 was a lawful exercise of selfdefence. The incident, which prima facie appeared to be a case of anticipatory
self-defence, was not explicitly condemned by the Security Council despite the
proposal put forward by the Soviet Union.4 ' However, a closer look at the
Israeli claims in the course of events reveals that Israel based its justification
38.

Letter from Daniel Webster, US Secretary of State, to Henry Fox, British Minister in

Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), reprintedin BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS: REPORTS AND PAPERS
FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL PRINT, part I, series C, vol. 1 153, 159 (Kenneth Bourne ed.,
1986).

39.

In Larger Freedom, supra note 22, at

40.

LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 218, 228 (2nd ed. 1979).

122.

In this context, it is worth noting that to consider state practice alone as constitutive of customary law would
be to deny the normative nature of international law. It is the second requirement, the expression of a feeling
of legal obligation (opiniojuris),that demarks the transposition of state practice onto customary law. In its
1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, the International Court
of Justice stated that the substance of customary international law must be found primarily in the actual
practice and feeling of obligation of States, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 253 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Opinion].
41.
See Greenwood, supra note 28, at 14.
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on a broad construction of an armed attack, rather than on the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defence-it maintained that its action was an act of selfdefence under Article 51 of the Charter after Egyptian forces had attacked Israel
first.42
In one contrasting example, Israel did try to justify its 1981 attack on the
Osirak nuclear reactor under construction in Iraq on the basis of anticipatory
self-defence. The Israeli government attempted to describe their action as a
response to Iraqi threats to develop nuclear weapons to be used against Israel
in the near future. 43 But the international response was sharply critical: the
Security Council roundly rejected Israeli arguments in its resolution 487."
Most members of the Security Council expressed their disagreement with the
Israeli view, by unreservedly voting in favour of the operative paragraph one
of the resolution, whereby the Council strongly condemned "the military attack
by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms
of international conduct."4' 5 For instance, Egypt and Mexico explicitly rejected
the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence. The United Kingdom likewise
condemned the Israeli attack "without equivocation." The then Prime Minister,
Margaret Thatcher, was characteristically blunt: "Armed attack in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach of international law."4' 6
These are not all instances of state practice where preventive or
anticipatory self-defence was a relevant issue, but they do reveal that state
practice is too scarce and inconsistent to allow any clear conclusion about the
legality and scope of anticipatory self-defence after 1945. But it needs to be
pointed out that at least on the policy level (opiniojuris)some of the key actors,
such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Australia, have
explicitly accepted its validity in certain pressing circumstances.
A prevailing view in legal scholarship seems to likewise accept that
anticipatory self-defence is permitted in the post-Charter international law, but
has traditionally required the existence of an imminent threat.47 A significant

42.
Summary Records of the 19th Meeting, [1967] Y.B. of U.N. 196, U.N. Sales No. E.68.I.1.
43.
See, e.g., Sean D. Magenis, NaturalLawas the Customary InternationalLaw of Self-Defence,
20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 413, 427(2002).
44.
S.C. Res. 487, 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
45.
Id.
46.
Michael Byers, A New Type of War, 26 LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS (online edition) (2004),
availableat http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n09/byer01.html (last visited Sept. 15,2006) (quotingPrimeMinister
Margaret Thatcher).
47.
Many prominent commentators including Dinstein, Greenwood, and Schachter have asserted
that the Carolinecriteria survived the entry into force of the UN Charter. In their view, they remain at the
very least a valuable tool for interpretation of the right of self-defence, helpful also in determining whether
and when that right may be invoked to deal with the modem threats.
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number of eminent scholars, including Bowett, 8 Franck,49 Greenwood,5"
Higgins,51 and Sands,52 have argued that a threat may be so direct and overwhelming to allow for self-defence also in case of an impending attack under
certain strict conditions. Recently, the UN High-level Panel, while acknowledging the restrictive language of Article 5 1, held in its report that "a threatened
State, according to long established international law, can take military action
as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it
and the action is proportionate."53 However, when the attack is not imminent,
authorization from the Security Council for the use of military force should be
secured.54
3. The Limits of Anticipatory Self-Defence: The Caroline Criteria
Jennings and Watts argued that anticipatory action in self-defence can be
justified under international law when an attack is imminent, creating an urgent
necessity for defensive action, leaving no practicable alternative, in particular,
when another State or other authority which has the legal powers to stop or
prevent the infringement is not able or willing to do so." Due to the obvious
risk of abuse of a more permissive conception of self-defence, the general
requirements of necessity and proportionality would have to be applied a
fortiorito any invocation of anticipatory self-defence.56
Necessity demands, essentially, that all non-military alternatives of redress
have been exhausted and the use of force remains the only viable option to
prevent the attack in the particular circumstances.57 Cassese has emphasized
that there must be "solid and consistent evidence" that another State is about to
engage in "a large-scale armed attack jeopardizing the very life" of a target

DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-192 (1958).
49.
See generallyTHOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002).
50.
See Greenwood, supra note 28.
Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards LegalAspects of the Use of Force,
51.
in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATIONS OF THE USE OF FORCE 435, 442 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986).
52.
Philippe Sands, International Law and the Use of Force, United Kingdom Parliament, 15 (July
30, 2005), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/441/
4060805.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
53.
Report of the High-level Panel, supra note 20, at 188.
124-25.
See, e.g., In Larger Freedom,supra note 22, at
54.
See generally PEACE, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
55.
eds., 1991).
56.
Id.at 41-42.
57.
See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategiesin InternationalLaw, 24 MICH. J.INT'L
L. 513, 530, 535-36 (2003).
48.
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State having no peaceful means of resolving the dispute at hand due to the
imminence of the attack and the futility of the measures.58
It is not always entirely clear what the condition of proportionality
requires. Dinstein proposed that this quintessential principle of self-defence,
in its basic terms, be understood as "a standard of reasonableness in the
response to force by counter-force. '59 There must be a symmetry or at least an
approximation between the action and it defensive purpose, namely that of
preventing the attack from occurring.6" Already in 1963, McDougal and
Feliciano argued that the principle of proportionality must be applied with some
flexibility, according to the specifics of a particular context.6 1 The scope of the
defensive action may under certain circumstances need to exceed the scale and
scope of the first attack or the threatened attack.62
As the third general limit on self-defence, the immediacy condition means
that there must be no "undue time-lag between the armed attack and the
exercise of self-defence. 6 3 This requirement has already been more broadly
construed in state practice in the age of terrorism and attacks without warning.
It has been interpreted as enabling a reasonably delayed response "where there
is a need to gather evidence of the attacker's identity and/or collect the
intelligence and [organize the] military force in order to strike back in a
targeted manner. '
Undoubtedly, the concept of imminence is the most problematic variable
of anticipatory self-defence and one that has no precise definition in
international law. It is currently rather unclear when an attack is sufficiently
"imminent" to justify military action in self-defence and it may indeed be very
difficult to ever express the imminence of a particular threat "in a legally robust
fashion."6 5
The Caroline requirement seems to have centred on the temporal
dimension of the notion and it is very stringent. It considers the threat to be
imminent when the attack is just about to occur or, in other words, when "[a]n
58.
Higgins, supra note 51, at 233.
59.
Dinstein, supra note 15, at 184.
60.
See also Leo Van Den Hole, AnticipatorySelf-Defence Under InternationalLaw, 19 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 69, 103 (2003).
61.
MYERS S. McDOUGAL AND FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 217 (1961).

62.
63.

Id.
Dinstein, supra note 15, at 184.

64.

ANGUS MARTYN, THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RESPONSE
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attack is in evidence. '66 Unilateral defensive force could accordingly be used
only in situations where weapons have been visibly launched but have not yet
reached their targets, or when forces have at least been mobilized with
apparently aggressive intent.
Such a restrictive requirement could hardly ever be satisfied in the context
of asymmetric warfare launched by terrorists or hostile governments. Applying
the narrow standard of temporal imminence in an age in which technology
allows great devastation to be wrought in a very short period of time would
disable a State from effectively repelling the attack and protecting its population from potentially great harm. The purpose of the following section is to
evaluate the need and potentials for adapting the traditional doctrines to the
changing realities.
III. REGULATION OF FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
A TIME FOR CHANGE?

A. Redefining Imminence: Needfor Clear(er)Standards
If the ultimate goal of international law is to preserve State's right to
effective self-defence, the standard of imminence may need to be read more
broadly. In that sense, the U.S. administration does not seek to overturn the
rule but seeks to explore how the rule and its underlying purpose could be
applied in particular situations that did not exist in the past.
Christopher Greenwood exposed two new factors not incorporated in the
Caroline test which should be relevant in determining whether an attack is
imminent: the gravity of the threat and the method of delivery of the threat.68
The potentially cataclysmic dimensions of an attack with nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons make this threat so disproportionate to the conventional
threats that existed in the times of the Carolinecase that it would be suicidal to
wait until the attack is visibly underway. 69 At the same time, the development
of advanced missile technology has improved the capability for stealth, leaving
literally no time for defence once an attack is launched and before it hits its
targets. 70 This is especially true with respect to contemporary terrorism

66.

ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW TASK

FORCE ON TERRORISM 9 (August 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf (last visited

Nov. 18, 2006).
67.
See Allen Buchanan and Robert 0. Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan
InstitutionalProposal,18 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1 (2004).
68.
See Greenwood, supra note 28, at 16.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
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characterized by clandestine preparations and surprise attacks: the evidence of
a specific attack coming will usually be only the attack itself.7
Therefore, the particularly grave threats which could materialize in attack
without a reasonable degree of warning and time for defence may be regarded
imminent even when the attack is not menacingly near. To quote Phillipe
Sands, the concept of imminence must be flexibly interpreted "in an age in
which technology allows great devastation to be wrought in a very short period
of time."72 Applying the narrow temporal standard of imminence in such
contemporary reality might deprive a State from an opportunity to effectively
repel the attack and protect its population from unimaginable harm. It would
go counter to the object and purpose of the right of self-defence which provides
States with a self-help mechanism to protect them from an attack when peaceful
alternatives would prove inadequate and the multilateral response too tardy.
Clearly, international law does not and should not give States a carte
blanche for aggression under the flag of anticipatory self-defence. Strict and
objective criteria should be agreed upon before any such reinterpretation could
be made. Some possibilities will now be examined.
If an attack is not temporally imminent, self-defence may be triggered only
when the threat of attack can be clearly identified on the basis of credible
intelligence. The threat must be very serious and its realization in case of
inaction certain or highly probable. Otherwise, the relaxed standard would
enable speculative defensive attacks clearly contrary to the restricting purpose
of the international regulation of force. The existence of such threat has to be
determined by reference to the capabilities of the alleged aggressor and their
specific intent to attack. Indeed, the capabilities of today's adversaries are
easier to conceal and the intent much more difficult to gauge. Nonetheless,
mere unfocused malevolence cannot be sufficient to justify unilateral recourse
to force.73
Once the threat has been appropriately identified, the defending State must
be reasonably convinced that no other viable alternative for counter-action but
military force remains. Clearly, the threshold for reaching such a conclusion
will be much higher when the condition of temporal imminence is less strictly
applied. Furthermore, in line with the traditional requirements for lawful selfdefence, the nature of the actual response must be reasonably proportional and
necessary to repel the threatened attack.

71.
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Sofaer summarized these requirements by proposing a set of factors and
circumstances that need to be considered when deciding whether the use of
force in anticipatory force is really necessary:
1)

The nature and magnitude of the threat involved;

2)

The likelihood that the threat will be realized unless pre-emptive
action is taken;

3)

The availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force;
and

4)

Whether using pre-emptive force is consistent with the terms
and purposes of the UN Charter and other applicable international agreements.74

Clearly, this new attitude is not problem-free. As shown above, the
concept of imminence is not free from ambiguities even when applied in its
traditional temporal sense, where it was required for the attack to be evident,
(at least possibly) visible to the potential victim and wider audience. More
uncertainties will inevitably arise once the temporal threshold is lowered to
accommodate contemporary security claims. The possible repercussions of this
shift could be counter-productive, which is why the credibility of evidence will
be one of the crucial conditions to satisfy in any given case. Admittedly, firm
intelligence that a devastating blow may be coming will be much more difficult
to attain than in the case where an attack is already underway; yet any error in
threat assessment could create or exacerbate the conflict rather than forestall its
violent manifestations.
In any case, an expansion of the circumstances validating self-defence will
have to place a higher burden of proof on a State to justify the steps it took to
avert an absolutely imminent attack. Unfortunately, this does not entirely
prevent the risks of error and abuse since the current international legal order
inherently lacks an effective system of accountability. That is why a serious
attempt to develop more effective procedures and mechanisms of accountability
must accompany any attempts to reinterpret the rules governing the unilateral
use of force.
Without a common understanding ofwhat constitutes an "imminent" threat
in the context of contemporary security reality, broad agreement on a lawful
military response will be hard to achieve. The standard of imminence should
remain an important part of the analysis, although new dimensions, such as the
gravity of the threat and the methods of delivery, need to be included into the
concept alongside the traditional considerations of temporal imminence.
74.

Soafer, supranote 35, at 220.
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Certain standards must hence be agreed to guide the decision-makers through
their considerations of unilateral military options in any given situation.
Building on the various approaches as outlined above, a framework governing
defensive actions against the non-conventional threats, could be developed
along the following elements:
1)

The specific character of the threat, including: the magnitude
of potential harm; the nature of strategies, tactics, and methods
of warfare (clandestine operations, surprise attacks, sophisticated technology, non-conventional weapons);

2)

The capacities of the alleged adversary;

3)

The manifestation of specific hostile intent of the alleged
adversary;

4)

The proximity of the threat and time available for defence;

5)

The likelihood of the threat being realized;

6)

Credible intelligence: availability of clear and convincing
evidence;
The exhaustion of all viable non-military alternatives to reduce
or eliminate the threat;

7)
8)

Compatibility of the military action with other principles of the
UN Charter and customary international law (necessity and
proportionality, duty to report to the Security Council,
termination of unilateral action after the Council has undertaken
the necessary steps).

B. Self-Defence beyond Imminence: Normative Perils of PreventiveActions
It seems possible to reconceptualize the Webster-formulated notion of
anticipatory self-defence this way in order to respond to the technological and
strategic developments that have made attacks stealthier, quicker, and more
devastating. If all of the narrowly defined conditions are satisfied, such grave
threats may justify an earlier use of unilateral defensive force that would be
unacceptable in case of a less serious threat. A State need not wait until an
attack is just about to occur, when waiting for that moment may deprive it of an
opportunity to effectively defend itself and its people against a serious threat
with potentially catastrophic consequences.
But the second dimension of the U.S. National Security Strategy statement
on self-defence goes beyond the above stated or, in fact, any legal limits. The
Bush administration made their case for military strikes against the non-
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conventional threats even where "uncertainty remains as to the time and place
of the enemy's attack."75
The main difficulty of such a stance is that when no credible reason exists
to believe that a threat is temporally imminent or highly probable, the recourse
to force against some unspecified hypothetical threats that might occur at some
time in the future would not be anticipatory but preventive. Unlike anticipatory
action, preventive war is not about pre-empting an immediate and credible
security threat, but about foiling the unspecified threats that might have
occurred at some uncertain time in the future. It is an offensive strategic
response to a long-term threat, not a defensive tactical response to an impending
attack, which is the underlying rationale of the anticipatory action.76
These pronouncements assert that the rules on self-defense need to be
modified so as to allow States to prevent a future attack, even when there is no
concrete evidence that an attack has been planned. On its face the proposed
doctrine is radically different from the existing regulation of the use of force.77
Contrary to the above discussion on adapting the existing legal standard of
imminence to make it more responsive to the present-day circumstances, this
second proposal is not a matter of degree, but a step into a different kind of
legal order. In my opinion, the logic of unilateral preventive strikes against the
threats-to-be, should also in the future be rejected in the global order governed
by the rule of law due to many concerns of both legal policy and principle,
some of which are contemplated below.78
1. Risks of Abuse and Instability of the Global Order
The essential problem of the U.S.-proposed doctrine is that it lacks any
conceptual clarity as to the actual scope and objective criteria for its
implementation. Such an excessively vague and politically attentive reading of
self-defence would enable the powerful actors to freely determine when and
how the rule applies and would increase the danger of abuse in pursuit of some
narrow national interest. Miriam Sapiro has described the willingness to
unilaterally use force against emerging threats before they are fully formed as

75.
National Security Strategy, supra note 3, at 15.
76.
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Motivefor War, 40 WORLD POL. 82, 91 (1987).
77.
States themselves are reluctant to endorse these developments. Apart from US, Russia, Israel
and Australia, most other key actors have expressed both political and normative resentment to the idea of
preventive strikes.
78.
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taking "the already controversial doctrine of anticipatory self-defence a step
further into the realm of subjectivity and potential danger."79
Indeed, power politics will always play an important role in international
system and the legal constraints on that power will probably never be
completely free from uncertainties. But opening the way to military actions
subject only to the more or less reliable threat assessment by single States and
incapable of formal legal scrutiny, could lead to an unrestricted exercise of
power against some perceived threats. Sofaer has zealously underlined this
risk: "[a]ny such doctrine would purport to allow States to attempt to ensure
their individual security, but by creating massive insecurity for others and
ultimately for themselves." 8
The conclusion of the UN High-level Panel was similarly straight-forward:
[I]n a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global
order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be
based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive
action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted.81
2. The Boomerang Effect: Return to Violence
Universal acceptance of the preventive strikes doctrine would create
greater potential for violence, the effect of which on reducing the contemporary
risks is highly questionable or even counter-productive. For example,
highlighting the preventive option would likely encourage the allegedly hostile
governments to accelerate development of precarious "launch-on-warning"
weapons systems and increase their military preparedness. The conflict with
North Korea and the recent escalation of the Iranian nuclear question expose
exactly these concerns. On the other hand, others may arm offensively to
"prevent the preventor" from eventually transferring them to the list of targets.82
Accepting this doctrine as a part of international law would in principle
enable that these two states to assert the right to attack the United States in
order to prevent the preventor from striking first. Subsequently, this could
fatally erode the already fragile norms and institutions designed to prevent
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
There is indeed no a priori satisfactory answer to these difficult questions
of risk management. But in a world that has become increasingly aware of the
advantages of using cooperative or "soft" power, tackling problems through
79.
Sapiro, supra note 36, at 599.
80.
Abraham D. Sofaer, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (March 31, 2003).
81.
Report of the High-level Panel,supra note 20, at 191.
82.
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persuasion rather than coercion, through economic and social influence rather
than military coercion, a shift in favour of the "hard power" would be a step in
reverse. This trend would undermine the rule of law in international relations,
promote the solving of problems through force rather than law, and deride the
efforts of preventive diplomacy and other peaceful preventive tools. As Arthur
Schlessinger Jr. eloquently observed, the new US strategy leads to replacement
of "a policy that aimed at peace through the prevention of war by a policy
aimed at peace through preventive war."83
3. Endangering Sovereign Equality of States
In addition to the general implications already discussed, the doctrine of
preventive self-defence as uttered by the U.S. administration, threatens one of
the fundamental principles of international law, the principle of sovereign
equality of States. Obviously, the United States does not want to make
prevention a widely accepted doctrine; the idea was, so it seems, to develop a
new concept that would, however, not be universally applicable. What would
they say in the entirely hypothetical event that China wanted to take preventive
action against Taiwan, saying that Taiwan was a threat to it? Or what if India
decided to attack Pakistan on that ground, or vice versa?
The U.S. administration is well aware that a formal legal reformulation
tailored exclusively to further US security interests would never gain the
widespread acceptance necessary to change the Charter or even customary
international law. But as Michael Byers observed, a de facto exceptionalism
might be accomplished indirectly, for instance "by introducing increased
ambiguity and thus providing more scope for power and influence in the
application of the rules to specific circumstances." 4
However, granting one or few great powers a privileged authority (either
formally or informally) over assessment and thwarting of aggressive threats can
hardly be reconciled with the principles of the international order, especially in
the area as sensitive as the international peace and security.
4. Weakening of International Norms and Institutions
There are additional problems with the argument that radical times require
radical means, reaching beyond the risk of the open-ended and ultimately
anarchic resorts to force. They entail also broader doctrinal difficulties.
Introducing into international law a rule incapable of defining workable legal
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limits on the defensive use of force, would mean, as Bothe pointed out, "that
the validity of the prohibition of the use of force itself will be in jeopardy." 5
There must remain at least some objective, non-political, standard by
which the military actions of States can be evaluated and either supported or
condemned as illegitimate. Eliminating even the minimum legal standards
(albeit partly unclear and controversial) and replacing them with purely
subjective judgments would mean to deprive international law on the use of
force of its normative character. In words of Thomas Franck: "a general
relaxation of Article 51s prohibitions on unilateral war-making to permit
unilateral recourse to force whenever a State feels potentially threatened could
lead to a reductio ad absurdum" and would "negate any role for law."86
IV. CONCLUSION

It is safe to say that the basic underlying assumptions of the doctrine of
self-defence no longer accurately reflect the geo-strategic realities characterized
by unconventional, asymmetric warfare, launched by trans-national terrorist
groups or other ostensibly undeterrable international actors. Law should of
course be sensitive to the new realities if it is to retain its normative power, but
cautiousness is needed as to the degree of modification. Its potential adaptation
seems to be more a matter of a careful re-interpretation of the existing rules
rather then dropping them altogether.
The challenges attending a more permissive approach to the unilateral use
of force require that any agenda relaxing the legal constraints on the unilateral
resort to force should be based on at least three main objectives. First,
prevention of the global security risks should remain a matter of collective
response. The Security Council is fully empowered to deal with every kind of
threat that States may confront, even with military force.87 This mechanism of
collective action has been created exactly with the purpose to replace the lack
of an objectively definable threshold of probability with regard to unspecified
and hypothetical future threats. Therefore, eventualpreventive military action
should be taken only with the prior Security Council authorization.
Second, in the context of modem warfare and shifts in strategic threats,
States may well need to use force without a prior Security Council authorization, even when an armed attack is not temporally imminent, but the threat of
it is overwhelming. However, clear and objectively verifiable criteria for
85.
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evaluation of the threat must first be developed to improve the unilateral
decision-making and to reduce the risk of error. An anticipatory action outside
the Security Council framework should be acceptable only after compelling
evidence is provided that there is a clear and present danger and that there are
no practical alternatives to a military strike
Finally, effective procedures and mechanisms of international review must
be established to screen every unilateral use of force and to ensure accountability in cases of abuse. Admittedly, this goal will be most difficult to achieve.
But until more effective procedures and mechanisms of accountability are
established, those powerful and creative governments that are prepared to use
force in bad faith will be able to overstretch any limits on the use of force to
provide a rationale for nearly any aggressive action not authorized by the
Security Council.
In conclusion, let me point out once more that taken as a whole, the
collective security system combined with a carefully re-interpreted doctrine of
self-defence would enable States to respond fully reactively, anticipatorily, or
preventively, to the necessities of the modern security environment. It is both
needless, as a matter of law, and too perilous for the stability of international
order, to eradicate the normative restraints on the unilateral preventive military
action. Such reality would only foster paranoiac aggression, not peace.

